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COMMENTS

CoRPORATIONs-ExTENT OF PowERS TO DISPOSE OF PROPERTY
IN WINDING UP ITS AFFAIRS UNDER STATUTES EXTENDING CORPORATE EXISTENCE-According to the common law a dissolved corporation ceased to exist for all purposes. Whether the dissolution was voluntary or involuntary, the effect of the dissolution was to deprive the
corporation of all powers either de jure or de facto.1 It was necessary, therefore, that corporations facing dissolution proceed without
delay toward a final liquidation and distribution of assets. Disregarding the old theory that personal property of dissolved corporations.
escheated to the state,2 and that its real estate reverted to the original
granter or his heirs,3 and that debts due the corporation were extin-

1 16 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATIONs, perm. ed., § 8u3 (1942), and
cases cited therein.
2 KENT, COMMENTARIES, 2d ed., 307 (1832), "All the personal estate of the
corporations vests in the people, as succeeding to this right and prerogative of the
crown, at common law."
3 2 KENT, ibid.; also, Folger ,,. Chase, 35 Mass. 63 (1836).
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guished,4 it is still apparent that hurried liquidation is not conducive
· to a realization of the true value of assets. Where the corporation could
foresee dissolution, for example, the expiration of its charter at a time
certain, and prudently initiated its winding u'.p procedure in adequate
time for a judicious disposal of its assets, it had to sacrifice a valuable
part of its remaining corporate life which might otherwise have been
used in carrying on the business for which it was formed. 5
Legislatures and courts early realized that some additional privileges should be given corporations in order that hardship be averted
upon dissolution. In Folger v. Chase,6 the court, in speaking of a statute which continued the existence of corporations for three years after
dissolution for the purpose of settling its affairs, said that it was a "just
and wise remedial law, and ought to be liberally expounded. The object of the statute was effectually to guard against the inequitable consequences of [the] rule of common law." 7 Although the statutes vary
in the different states,8 the Michigan statute may be taken as a typical
example of the legislative extension of corporate existence for special
purposes after dissolution. It provides: "All corporations-whose charters shall have ~xpired by limitation or dissolution or shall be annulled
by forfeiture or in any other way or manner have become void shall
nevertheless continue to be bodies corporate for the further term of
three years from such expiration, dissolution or forfeiture for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits for or against them and of
enabling them gradually to settle and close their affairs and to dispose
of and convey their property and to,divide their assets; but not for the
4
In Clinton v. Coppedge, (D.C. Okla. 1933) 2· F. Supp. 935, the court held that,
under the Iowa law, debts to or from the corporation were extinguished on dissolution.
The modern view i,s more nearly approached in 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES, 2d ed., 307
(1832), wherein it'is recognized that such an extinguishment results in gross inequities.
5
This argument is expounded as a reason for liberal construction of the extension
clauses in Bewick v. Alpena Harbor Improvement Co., 39 Mich. 700 at 706 (1878).
See also Ruggles v. Buckley and Douglas Lumber Co., 210 Mich. 58 at 65, 177 N.W:
270 (1920).
6
35 Mass. 63 (1836).
7 Id. at 66.
8 Some statutes have no express time limit on the period of extension; see for
example Ky. Rev. Stat. (1944) § 271.300. In Holliday v. Cornett, Sheriff, 224 Ky.
356, 6 S.W. (2d) 497 (1928), it was held that reasonable length of time is the period
of extension contempl;ited by the legislature. Flexibility would appear to be a desired
result. It appears however that the majority of the states have statutes which fix a definite time limit; although some permit extension'beyond the statutory period for special
purposes, for example, allowing corporations to carry through actions to a final judgment.. See Hornstein, "Voluntary Dissolution-A New Development In Intracorporate
Abuse," 51 YALE L. J. 64 at 71-74 (1941). In Gamalski Hardware, Inc. v. Sheriff,
298 Mich. 662, 299 N.W. 757 (1941), the court held that even though the statutory
three year extension had expired the dissolved corporation C?uld maintain an action of
replevin.
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purpose of continuing the business for which such corporations were
organized. . • ." 9 Although the prohibition of continuing its business
after dissolution is such a natural result of dissolution that the express
limitation partakes of cautious redundancy, its application to particular situations may not be so obvious.
In Kay Furniture Company v. Rovin,1° a corporation, which had
been engaged in the furniture business, and had assigned all its assets,
except a lease on the premises occupied, to its sole stockholder who had
in turn sold to defendant "the entire stock of merchandise, fixtures and
good will," 11 exercised after dissolution its option to extend its lease
on the building for two years. Although the corporation thereby assumed obligations incident in the lease, the Michigan Supreme Court
held that it was not engaging in business for which it had been created,
and that it was a valid step in the winding up of corporate affairs.
Under the statute, assets of the corporation do not pass to stockholders, ·
but, rather, title remains in the corporation.12 The option to renew the
lease obviously was of value; in order to realize the most out of this
asset the corporation exercised the option. One more step appears
necessary, however, in this winding up procedure; that is, disposal of
the lease, ~ince the corporation could no longer engage in the furniture
business and had no other assets, the lease would seemingly be valuable to the corporation only in the amount it could realize by subletting the premises. The case arose, however, because the corporation
was seeking possession from its former tenant. Although this does not
appear at first glance to be a step toward liquidation of assets, the court
unanimously rejected the defendant's argument that the corporation
was continuing its business by renewing the lease. It is difficult to see
any validity to the argument that a corporation is engaging in the
furniture business by renewing a lease, its only remaining asset. The
defendant-tenant was undoubtedly disappointed that the corporation
would not sub-lease to him; and the fact that the corporation had a
single stockholder, and that after the sole stockholder acquired the
9

Mich. Acts (1931) Act 327, § 75, as amended, Mich. Acts (1933) Act 96.
Prior to its amendment, the Michigan statute was held inapplicable to corporations
voluntarily dissolved in Jacobs v. E. Bement's Sons, 161 Mich. 415, 126 N.W. 1043

(1910).
10

312 Mich. 290, 20 N.W. {2d) 194 (1945).
Id. at 292.
12
Id. at 294-295. In the absence of statute, "On dissolution, the legal title to land
passes to the stockholders, and title to the corporate property vests in the stockholders
as tenants in common •.••" 16 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS, perm. ed.,
§ 8134 (1942). Compare, Stearns Coal and Lumber Co. v. Douglas, 299 Ky. 314,
185 S.W. (2d) 385 (1945). Where statutes are present, see 13 AM. JuR., Corporations, § 1365, p. 1206, wherein it is stated that ."the purpose of statutes of the kind
under discussion is manifestly • • • • to allow the retention of the title to their property
by the corporations themselves. • . ."
11
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business, he had sold it to the defendant, makes the situation more appealing for the defendant. A corporation, however, should not be compelled to.dispose of its assets to any particular buyer; one of the purposes of the statutes, it appears, is to give the corporation time to shop
around .for more advantageous liquidation. Nor does it appear that
this corporation, in taking this preliminary step toward liquidation of
its remaining asset, engaged in new business.
In Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company v. American National
Red Cross 13 it was held that a charitable association which had forfeited
its charter for failure to file returns could receive donations, if the
corporation revived before the expiration of the statutory period of
extension. This case has been cited as authority for the proposition that
a dissolved corporation may, in winding up its affairs, acquire property.14 The Michigan court cited the proposition in the Kay Furniture
Company case.15 While it is difficult to compare the obligations assumed
by the corporation in the Michigan case with those of a donee of a gift,
it is submitted that it is no undue extension of the privileges generally
given corporations to hold that "within proper limitations . . .. a corporation may assume obligations which are incident to the liquidation
of its assets." 16 Although it was not material to the issue, a statement
of a New Hampshire court gives us further insight into the scope of
powers implied from statutes extending the existence of corporations.
The corporation, it was said, co\lld, after dissolution, exercise its option
under a lease to purchase the premises, although the corporation could
not continue to use the premises in the performance of its corporate
business.11 There is no reason why the limitations placed upon the
exploitation of assets by dissolved ·corporatio.ns should be strictly construed.
While it may be true that some courts are hesitant to permit dissolved corporations to assume further obligations in the process of
liquidation of assets,18 it is submitted that the Michigan case was no
undue extension of the implied powers. of dissolved corporations in
view of the purpose of the statutes giving the privileges, and the fact
• that for all practical purposes in this case the only way to receive the
13

50 R.I. 461, 149 A. 581 (1930).

16 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATIONs, perm. ed., § 8171 (1942).
312 Mich. 290 at 296, 20 N.W. (2d) 194 (1945).
16 Id. at 295.
17 Conn v. Manchester Amusement Co., 79 N.H. 450, III A. 339 (1920).
18 Bank of Alameda County v. McColgan, (Cal. App. 1945) 159 P. (2d) 31,
although it will be noted that· the restriction upon defunct corporations' power to
contract and incur debts operated for the benefit of the corporation in this case. McBride v. Clayton, 140 Tex. 71, 166 S.W. (2d) 125 (1942), strictly construing powers
remaining in dissolved corporations. Also, Cushman Motor Works v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, (C.C.A. 8th, 1942) 130 F. (2d) 977.
14

15
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true value of the option was to exercise it, with the view of disposing
of the resulting estate. Does this broad interpretation of the "winding
up" clause imperil the satisfaction of creditor claims against the corporation, or weaken the protection of stockholders who will ultimately
receive the remaining assets? The protection is not dissipated, because
the very :flexibility contended for the clause gives the courts more
discretion in permitting actions which benefit the corporation and ultimately its creditors and stockholders.
Joseph R. Brookshire, S.Ed.

